The academic community has yet to settle on the manner and mechanisms by which economics-based counterinsurgency initiatives affect violence levels. This piece considers the effect of local-business revitalization initiatives on insurgent violence by analyzing Iraqi First, an initiative implemented by the U.S. military in Iraq through which billions of dollars were committed to local commodity and service purchases. Results generated with a two-stage least squares model provide evidence that spending on locally sourced goods and services through Iraqi First was responsible for reducing attacks on Coalition targets during the study period. The results remain robust even as significant violations to the exclusion restriction are imposed.
Introduction
In an effort to combat insurgents during the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan where levels of violence largely restricted civilian agencies from operating independently, the U.S.
Government directed the development of asymmetric warfare programs designed to quell insurgency violence through the promotion of improved economic conditions. These programs, which cost billions of dollars annually over the course of the conflicts, have included the provision of social services, major infrastructure development and repair projects, reemployment schemes, and local-business revitalization initiatives.
This broad counterinsurgency strategy reflects a general belief that poor economic conditions are conducive to the persistence and intensity of insurgency. Existing research on the subject suggests that community tailored service-provision programs can serve to reduce insurgent violence within affected host countries. Yet, the effect of employment-generating programs on insurgent violence remains ambiguous, though analysis indicates, somewhat counterintuitively, that the two are positively correlated. Finally, no rigorous analysis of the effect of business revitalization on levels of insurgent violence has yet been conducted. By analyzing outcomes under Iraqi First, a U.S. military initiative implemented in 2006 under which billions of dollars were spent on locally supplied commodities and services, this piece seeks to contibute to the existing body of knowledge by assessing how host-nation business revitalization initiatives affect violence levels.
From a policy perspective, such questions are of fundamental importance. Economics based counterinsurgency programs continue to be used actively in Afghanistan, where their efficacy remains uncertain. More broadly, within the Defense Department, the development of asymmetric warfare capabilities is now considered of equal importance to that of conventional warfare, representing nothing short of a fundamental reorientation of U.S. foreign policy rooted in the belief that guerilla-style warfare will account for the majority of actions in which the United States will be engaged within the foreseeable future.
Robert Gates remarked during his tenure as U.S. Secretary of Defense that " [t] he real challenges we have seen emerge since the end of the Cold War -from Somalia to the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere -make clear we in defense need to change our priorities to be better able to deal with the prevalence of 'asymmetric warfare'... [I] t is hard to conceive of any country challenging the United States directly in conventional military terms at least for some years to come... [H] istory shows us that smaller, irregular forces -insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists -have for centuries found ways to harass and frustrate larger, regular armies and sow chaos. We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time."
1 At the very least, the Secretary's position reflects the prominent role that such form of warfare has played within the international system during the past sixty years [Fearon and Laitin, 2003 ].
The Pentagon's intensified focus on irregular warfare capabilities has elevated stability operations, of which economics-based programs are a significant component, to the fore of The economic well-being of a population has a demonstrable effect on the likelihood of the emergence of insurgency. Academic findings suggest that, ceteris paribus, communities with low per capita income are more likely to experience the onset of civil conflict [Fearon and Laitin, 2003 ]. Yet, the manner by which economic conditions serve to affect the duration and intensity of insurgency is not fully understood. Rebel access to resources that can be used to fund operations is clearly important to the nature of insurgency. The availability of contraband financing, for instance, has been observed to contribute to the persistence of civil conflict [Fearon, 2004] . Yet, such findings say little about the way in which economic conditions to which members of the general population are exposed during conflict affect the nature of the insurgency.
Conventional counterinsurgency doctrine suggests generally that as the economic condition of the local population is improved, the strength of the insurgency diminishes. The U.S.
Army's Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, issued by then Lieutenant Generals David Petraeus and James Amos several years after the initiation of major military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, describes the function of counterinsurgent agents as "providing for social services," "supporting reconstruction," and "protecting... infrastructure from direct attacks"
as a means of "[g]aining and retaining the initiative" against an insurgency [Petraeus and Amos, 2009] . Such strategy is generally conceived as contributing to victory against rebel forces by encouraging "the populace [to consent] to the governments legitimacy and [refrain from] actively and passively supporting the insurgency" [Petraeus and Amos, 2009] .
Furthermore, it is generally assumed that initial economic improvements beget longerterm development that ultimately serves to curtail insurgent violence. "Accomplishing the objectives of combat operations/civil security operations sets the conditions needed to achieve essential services and economic development objectives. When the populace perceives that the environment is safe enough to leave families at home, workers will seek employment or conduct public economic activity. Popular participation in civil and economic life facilitates further provision of essential services and development of greater economic activity.
Over time such activities establish an environment that attracts outside capital for further development" [Petraeus and Amos, 2009] . From the perspective of an occupying force, as the United States has been in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is certain truth to such logic.
If the host-nation government to which the occupying force intends to ultimately transfer power is to sustain an effective counterinsurgency campaign, revenue streams necessary to finance such campaign must be established and are likely to be greater under conditions of improved economic activity. 
Unemployment
Unemployment reduction has been widely suggested as a possible mechanism through which economics based programs operate. NATOs counterinsurgency guidance issued to Coalition forces asserts that insurgents "co-opt disenfranchised groups and pay young men to fight."
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This argument is rooted in an opportunity-cost theory, which holds that individuals will base their decisions to enlist in an insurgency organization upon, at least in part, the expected monetary payoffs. For unemployed members of society, service with an insurgency may offer the highest incentive. . Accordingly, levels of insurgency should intensify concurrent with rising employment. The authors derive results supporting the notion that information-cost and/or security effects are at play, although, data constraints do not allow them to distinguish between the respective effects.
Hearts and Minds
Currying public favor (or winning hearts and minds, as it is commonly referred) has been suggested as a possible alternative mechanism through which economics based programs work to affect insurgency. offer the most detailed treatment of this possibility thus far developed. They advance a model of interaction between "rebels seeking political change through violence, a government trying to minimize violence through some combination of service provision and hard counterinsurgency, and civilians deciding whether or not to share information about insurgents with government forces" and find both theoretical and empirical evidence that the provision of services tailored to satisfy the specific needs of target communities can reduce insurgent violence . Specifically, their findings suggest that providing such services can persuade community members to share critical information with counterinsurgents that effectively serves to undermine the insurgency.
According to such theory, a government's ability to demonstrate that it is capable of delivering social services to the community inspires general confidence in the government's parallel ability to provide for public security. This in turn encourages community members to share with the government information about the insurgency. "Signaling both capacity and commitment to providing security is critical to increasing support, cooperation, and information flow from the population. Economic aid and service provision by government then contribute to the popular perception that the state is capable of maintaining order and enforcing security" .
Subsequent research conducted by Beath, Christia and Enikolopov [2012] provides additional evidence of this theory. Based on the results of a randomized field experiment conducted in Afghanistan, they find that except within the most violent districts, Afghan villages selected to receive government sponsored "projects... focused on either the construction or rehabilitation of infrastructure... or the provision of human capital development" tend to experience fewer "security incidents both in the short-run and in the long-run" [Beath, Christia and Enikolopov, 2012] .
Theory
The empirical findings presented above suggest that some economic counterinsurgency decrease violence levels as intended and others may result in increases in insurgent violence.
These opposing outcomes suggest that the direction of the effect depends on the details of the business revitalization program. One crucial distinction between the candidate causal mechanisms in the extant literature described above lies in whom these revitalization initiatives employ. If the program recruits insurgents (or those likely to join their ranks) into licit occupations and away from well-paying insurgents, the insurgency's labor supply is reduced and overall violence levels fall.
9 Alternatively, a counterinsurgency program that employs non-insurgent citizens may increase violence levels by raising the costs of obtaining actionable intelligence from these citizens.
This section articulates the implications of each causal mechanism and presents a strategy for testing it against the case of business revitalization efforts undertaken by the U.S. Defense Department in Iraq. In contrast to previous empirical investigations about economic aspects of counterinsurgency, data is available with great detail and reliability for this case. To narrow the list of plausible causal mechanisms at work in the Iraqi case requires establishing whether economic counterinsurgency programs reduced or increased violence. An increase in violence would point to a self-defeating program that made intelligence collection more difficult for counterinsurgents. On the other hand, a decrease in attacks should direct the attention of researchers toward mechanisms involving the creation of alternative employment opportunities for would-be insurgents.
A finding that business revitalization is positively correlated with levels of insurgent violence would lend preliminary support for the existence of information-cost effects. Business revitalization initiatives within a particular community could increase insurgency violence by increasing employment and thus elevating the cost of intelligence acquisition. As counterinsurgent agents direct business to local firms, affected businesses should respond to increased demand through some combination of increased employment of labor and capital, thereby expanding labor market opportunities. Another plausible explanation for economic stimulus leading to violence would be if the funds directly or indirectly increased the insurgencys revenues. Commerce has never been the exclusive domain of law-abiding businessmen, and criminal elements have long operated legitimate businesses to raise revenues and conceal criminal activities. Even where counterinsurgent vetting efforts minimize direct relations with insurgent-affiliated businesses, second-and third-order spending effects as well as unsupervised sub-contractual arrangements might serve to expand insurgent revenues. Unfortunately, available data provides no means by which to detect any such potential effects.
If a business revitalization initiative succeeds in reducing insurgent violence, it is likely by modifying the labor markets conditions and raising the opportunity costs of joining or remaining employed with an insurgency. Furthermore, as with community-tailored services provision, business revitalization initiatives might also increase community members' willingness to share information with counterinsurgency agents by signaling the government's capacity and commitment to providing for public security. While the effect of business stimulation may be less visible or salient to community members than the provision of social services such as trash collection or schoolhouse repairs, the measures should provide such signal to community members who serve as management or labor for affected businesses.
Moreoever, business owners often serve as community leaders who may be more attuned to suspicious activities taking place within their communities than average citizens and may thus be better placed to share meaningful intelligence about an insurgency's activities.
A reduction in violence as a consequence of Iraqi First would not exclude the possibility that information-cost effects are not at play. However, they would suggest that the effect of changes to opportunity costs, signaling government capability and commitment, or some combination of both is more significant. Likewise, while a positive finding would not preclude the possibility of changes to opportunity costs or signaling, it would imply the existence of information-cost effects or some other dominant force favorable to the insurgency. Before the implications of each causal mechanism can be tested and observed, the effect of business revitalization in Iraq must be established.
Data
Contractual obligations made with Iraqi vendors during fiscal years 2007 and 2008 were procured from the U.S. Army Contracting Business Intelligence System and are aggregated to the month-district level and denoted by D t,i ∈ R 10 , where t and i denote time periods 1, ..., n and districts 1, ..., m, respectively. This data, which has not previously been used in academic studies focused on counterinsurgency strategies, was made available to the author for the specific purposes of this study. 
Incidents of insurgency violence against

13
10 Contracts may take negative dollar values, reflecting incidents of de-obligation that occur when a contract is cancelled or modified to reflect renegotiated terms.
11 This includes, but is not limited to, spending by the U.S. Agency for International Development and through the Commander's Emergency Response Program program, Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Development Funds for Iraq, and Economic Stabilization Funds. For a full list of programs, consult the ESOC -Iraq Civil War Dataset Codebook (Version 3.0). Total project spending is distributed evenly across months, following the approached used by .
12 See: https://esoc-edit.princeton.edu/subfiles/codebook-iraq-civil-war-dataset-v3 13 Data on contractual obligations and certain controls are available only at the province level; in such cases, each district is assigned the monthly value corresponding to the province within which that district falls. 
Identification Strategy
This section details the strategy for identifying both the effect of and potential mechanism of business revitalization efforts pursued in Iraq.
Ordinary Least Squares
Model
Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis is used to generate an initial associational relationship between spending on local goods and services and attacks on Coalition. Specifically, I test the equation:
The average contract period of performance during fiscal years 07 and 08 is 27 days.
14 A lagged specification of t − 2 captures violence levels between one and two months after contracts are committed.
Controls
Control variables contained in V t,i are included to control for omitted variable bias and 
Simultaneity
OLS estimates could be biased if it were the case that local spending was intentionally applied in areas that suffered the greatest levels of violence while being restricted from more peaceful areas. However, the Defense Departments contingency contracting processes and interviews conducted with contracting officials directly engaged in the local contracting process lend significant evidence against this possibility. While the program of local spending was conceived of by senior defense policymakers as a counterinsurgency strategy, its implementation was guided by strict legal requirements mandated through the Defense supplement of the 15 Greater troop levels may lead to an increase in levels of violence by providing for a greater number of targets. Alternatively, larger troop levels in a given area may represent greater counterinsurgency capacity and correspond to fewer attacks. I do not attempt to resolve such debate in this piece but simply acknowledge the importance of controlling for troop levels.
Federal Acquisition Regulations. Specifically, contracting officials were not allowed to award contracts on the basis of levels of violence within a given region but were instead obligated to follow a process that involved competitive selection on vendor cost estimates and, where applicable, previous vendor performance.
Endogeneity concerns would also arise if it were the case that local spending tended to be applied in less violent areas. Given wartime dynamics, this might have occurred had vendors in areas less afflicted by insurgency violence faced lower operating costs (and thus tended to submit more competitive bids); alternatively, business owners in less violent areas might have been less concerned about retaliation by militants for having engaged in business with the Coalition and thus more apt to submit bids. Once again, available evidence does not appear to support such dynamics. In particular, spending patterns appear to have been driven toward areas of the country in which commercial activity has historically been the greatest; incidentally, such areas were also more likely to experience insurgency violence.
Vendors from Baghdad, for instance, were awarded the greatest number of contracts during the study period; Baghdad also suffered the greatest number of insurgency attacks during that time. Nevertheless, to control for level of economic activity, I include data on per capita income within the model as a coarse proxy for local levels of economic activity.
Instrumental Variable Analysis
Whatever the results of the OLS analysis, they provide evidence of but fail to conclusively substantiate a causal effect of the treatment on outcomes. I, therefore, extend the preceding analysis through the use of a two-stage least squares model.
The Defense Department exhibits a tendency to increase the number of contractual obligations made during the last months of the fiscal year. Agencies within the Department compete for resources, and the failure of any given agency to allocate the entirety of its appropriated budget during a given fiscal year can affect future Congressional appropriations by creating the perception that fewer resources for future operations are required.
16 Bureaucrats seeking to maximize future funding are thus incentivized to obligate all remaining funds before year's end. This inefficient practice of federal government provides a unique instrument by which to assess the effect of spending on insurgency.
I begin with a basic model, but later introduce variations to such to address potential violations to particular causal variable instrument assumptions [Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996] . Specifically, let Y t,i = β 0 + β 1 Z t−2,i + β 2 D t−3,i + β 3 V t,i + e t,i . Furthermore, let D t−2,i = α 0 +α 1 Z t−2,i +α 2 D t−3,i +α 3 V t,i +e t,i , where Z t−2,i denotes whether spending takes place during the final two months of the fiscal year. Then, β 1 /α 1 estimates the effect of year-end fiscal spending on recorded incidents of insurgency violence against Coalition forces two-to-three months where:
provided instrumental variable assumptions are satisfied.
An initial concern is whether E(Z t−2,i * v t,i ) = 0. Existing pathways through which spending is directed to Iraqi businesses are likely to affect the placement of excess fiscal-year-end funds. However, if this is so, controlling for where spending was directed in preceding time periods (as modelled, for D t−3,i ) ensures that this exogeneity condition is met by conditioning on previous spending channels. Second, it is assumed that
Available evidence suggests that year-end hikes in contractual obligations are unrelated to the activities of insurgents in Iraq. End-of-fiscal-year spending hikes can be observed in have detected "consistent escalations of sectarian and insurgent attacks during Ramadan but those escalations were neither statistically significant nor unique to Ramadan" [Hassner, 2011] .
If Ramadan does indeed influence violence levels during the period in question, the expected effect is weakly positive.
Model Variations
I introduce two variations to the model presented above.
Relaxing the Exclusion Restriction
In the first model variation, the assumption that the exclusion restriction is strictly met is relaxed. The parameter γ is set to denote the average partial effect of Z t−2,i on Y t,i and is used to assess the sensitivity of the basic 2SLS model results to varying degrees of possible exclusion restriction violation. In the second analysis, a γ local-to-zero approximation approach is used, and information on the potential violating effect of Ramadan is used to establish priors. Specifically, Hassner 
Leading Contractual Obligations By One Additional Month
In the second modified model, local contractual obligations are set to lead violence levels by a period of two to three months: Y t,i = β 0 + β 1 Z t−3,i + β 2 D t−4,i + β 3 V t,i + e t,i , and
In this model, the end of the fiscal year is assumed to be indepedent of violence levels two to three months later, conditional on non-Iraqi First spending. Specifically, it is unclear that Ramadan, if even violence increasing, should have any persistent effect on violence levels several months later. Indeed, monthly patterns of violence from Iraq can be seen to spike during the month of Ramadan and fall sharply thereafter (see Figure 1) . To the extent that such trend captures a violence increasing effect of Ramadan, the pattern is consistent with the notion that combatants are directly affected by the holiday -perhaps because, as Hassner 
Results
OLS Regression Results
Results of OLS regression analysis indicate that contractual obligations are negatively correlated with acts of insurgency violence against the Coalition (P < 1.69e − 06) (TABLE This estimate maintains its statistical significance even as substantial deviations from the classical 2SLS assumption that γ = 0 within the first adjusted model. Specifically, using the γ local-to-zero approximation approach, violations to the exclusion restriction of up to nearly 30% of monthly mean attacks may persist before the instrument loses significance at the 95% level.
Finally, these results are consistent with the results generated in the second adjusted model, in which contractual obligations are set to lead violence levels by one additional month.
Placebo Test
If the identification strategy described above reflects reduced violence levels against Coalition forces at time t following exogenous changes in contractual obligations made at time period t − 2, then such strategy should show no meaningful correlation between these variables when their temporal order is reversed (i.e. between obligations made at time period t and insurgent attacks at time period t−2). Testing whether β 1 /α 1 = 0, therefore, offers one form of placebo test against which the results presented in the previous section can be tested.
As expected, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that β 1 /α 1 = 0 (P < 0.54).
This finding provides further support for the identification strategy used to test the effect of contractual obligations on violence levels (Table 4) A final, though less immediate implication, concerns whether or not such program should be applied in future environments. Further study should seek to understand the precise conditions under which it is likely to be effective.
Appendix
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent and Clustered Standard Errors
Were it the case that variance of the error terms is not consistent across observations or that the error terms within a given province are not independent, then the basic standard error calculations used in initial analysis above may be incorrect. As a robustness check, the results are recalculated using both heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and clustered standard errors at the province level. In both cases, standard errors remain largely unchanged from their original values, and the results remain significant at the 95% confidence level (TABLE 5) . Because the standard errors vary little between all three models, concern over model misspecification is minimized [King and Roberts, 2012] .
Province-Level Robustness Check
As a robustness check, OLS and 2SLS results are recalcuated when all data is aggregated to the province level. The the effect of local spending commitments on violence remains positive and statistically significant at the 95% level (TABLE 6).
Outliers -Cook's Distance Analysis
Finally, to test whether one or more outlying data points are responsible for driving the results obtained, the data is subset such that only observations with Cook's Distances greater than the standard threshold of 4/n are dropped, resulting in 73 fewer observations. When the IV-2SLS analysis is repeated using the subsetted data, the resulting residual plot and the significance of the β coefficient remain largely unchanged (TABLE 7) . 
